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A PYRRHIC VICTORY AT FOLEY SQUARE:
THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND SABBATINO
RICHARD

B.

LILLICHt

T HE SECOND

Circuit's opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino' will be received with mixed emotions by those international lawyers who believe that "the poverty and inadequacy of the
international remedies make the availability of municipal courts of
the greatest importance in providing effective redress for violations of
international law." 2 For while Circuit Judge Waterman, like Judge
Dimock in his much-noted District Court opinion,' refused to apply
the act of state doctrine and held that the act in question (a Cuban
nationalization decree) violated international law, his reason for finding
"an exception to the judicial abnegation required by the act of state
doctrine"4 comes as a distinct disappointment.
Rejecting Judge Dimock's view that the act of state doctrine does
not apply where the validity under international law of the act of a
foreign state is challenged, Judge Waterman bases his exception upon
three Department of State communications which, while "somewhat
ambiguous . .. [,] express a belief on the part of those responsible
for the conduct of our foreign affairs that the courts here should
decide the status here of Cuban decrees." 5 Thus the promising exception introduced by the District Court decision is glossed over and the

t Assistant Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies, Syracuse
University College of Law; A.B., 1954, Oberlin College; LL.B., 1957, Cornell
University; LL.M., 1959 JS.D., 1960, New York University.
1. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3095
(U.S. Sept. 4, 1962) (No. 403), views of Solicitor General requested, 83 Sup. Ct.
253 (1962).
2. COMM. ON INT'L LAW, ASS'N Or THE BAR OF THE CITY or NEW YORK, A
REcoNSIDERATION OF THE AcT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES COURTS 2 (1959).
3. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
An often perceptive but sometimes uneven analysis of the District Court's opinion
may be found in Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts
in the International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1961) (hereinafter cited "Falk"). See also Coerper,
The Act of State Doctrine in the Light of the Sabbatino Case, 56 AM. J. INT'L L.
143 (1962) ; Garretson, International Law, 1961 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 1, 23-24; and
Comment, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607, 1614-18 (1962). The District Court decision is
noted in 4 ARIZ. L. REv. 78 (1962) ; 3 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 282 (1962) ; 49
CALir. L. REv. 979 (1961) ; 47 CORNELL L.Q. 659 (1962) ; 11 DE PAUL L. REV. 76
(1961) ; 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 523 (1962); 47 IOWA L. REv. 765 (1962) ; 60 MiCn.
L. REv. 231 (1961) ; 8 N.Y.L.F. 148 (1962) ; 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 155 (1962); 110
U. PA. L. REv. 122 (1961) ; 23 U. Pnr. L. REv. 816 (1962) ; 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REX'.
159 (1961) ; 14 STAN. L. REv. 172 (1961) ; 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 165 (1961); and
1962 Wis. L. REv. 386.
4. 307 F.2d at 857.
5. Id. at 858.

(155)
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case handled as one falling under the Bernstein approach,' which allows
a court to ignore the doctrine only "when the executive branch of our
Government announces that it does not oppose inquiry by American

courts into the legality of foreign acts ... "'
It is the contention of this writer that the rationale behind the

Second Circuit's exception to the act of state doctrine is an unfortunate
one, since by substituting executive approval for alleged violation of
international law as the basis of the exception to the doctrine the court
restricts the role of international law in such disputes, raises complex
questions of judicial-executive relations and, as a consequence, decreases
the availability of municipal courts to determine upon the merits cases
involving acts of foreign states. An assessment of the District Court
and Second Circuit opinions supports this contention.
I.

BACKGROUND.

Under the so-called act of state doctrine, courts in the United
States have refused to inquire into the validity of certain acts of
foreign states, whether alleged to violate the municipal law of the
foreign state' or the public policy of the United States,' under the
theory that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory.""u
The doctrine is not a rule of public international law," but "a principle
of judicial self-restraint and deference to the role of the executive or
political branch of government in the field of foreign affairs."12
Recently, nationalization decrees of foreign states have given rise
to many potential act of state cases. In the typical situation, State A
takes the property of an alien located within its territory and transfers
it to Y, who then brings the property into State B. If State B applies
the act of state doctrine, an action by the former alien owner against
Y to recover the property will be dismissed by the courts of State B
without a consideration of the validity of State A's taking of the
6. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947) ; Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Anierikaansche Stoomvaart-

Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). See Comment, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1278,
1310 (1962).
7, 307 F.2d at 857.
8, RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 42 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
text at notes 25 & 120 infra.
9. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 43 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
text at notes 26 & 121 infra.

10. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 S. Ct. 83, 84 (1897).
generally RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS chs. 3, 5, 11 (1951).

See
See

See

11. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, Explanatory Notes § 41, comment g at

134 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The International Law Association adopted this
position by an overwhelming vote at its Brussels Conference in August, 1962.
12. COMMITTEE ON THE JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF NATIONALIZATION AND FOREIGN
PROPERTY, AMERICAN BRANCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE
"ACT OF STATE" DOCTRINE 3 (Brussels Conference, 1962).
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property. Some courts 8 and most writers, 4 however, have taken the
position that the act of state doctrine does not preclude the examination
of the validity of foreign nationalization decrees under international
law. 1 5
The latter position was advocated in 1959 in a well-known report
by the Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York.' 6 Relying heavily upon this report, the tentative draft of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States adhered to this view the following year.' Finding that
"no American case has raised the question of application of the doctrine ... when a foreign act of state is charged with being in' conflict
with, or in violation of, international law,"' 8 the Restatement concluded:
In this absence of controlling precedent, courts of the United
States would appear to be free to consider on its merits the act of
a foreign state charged to be in violation of, or in conflict with,
international law. As international law is part of the law of the
United States, and applicable directly in its courts, the question
whether it has been violated should be considered as a legal question not subject to suspension in order to prevent embarrassment
19
in the conduct of foreign affairs.
Such was the situation in the United States when Judge Dimock was
presented with the facts of Sabbatino. From his opinion, which cites
the Restatement five times, it is quite apparent that Judge Dimock inand
tended to fit these facts into the framework of the Restatement
20
supply a "controlling precedent" supporting its position.
Banco Nacional is not the typical act of state case given above. 1
Farr Whitlock, a New York commodity broker, entered into contracts
for the purchase of sugar with a wholly-owned Cuban subsidiary of
13. A collection of cases may be found in Judge Dimock's opinion, 193 F. Supp.
at 380 n.6.
14. Id. at 380 n.7.
15. Compare text at notes 8 & 9 supra.
16. See note 2 supra. The report is commended in Hyde, The Act of State
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 635 (1959) and criticized in
Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law - A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L.
141 (1960).
17. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 28d(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960).
18. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, Explanatory Notes § 28d, comment e at
19 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960). This statement has been called "flatly wrong and
confusing" by Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23
U. PITT. L. REv. 881, 885 (1962). A later draft of the Restatement modifies the
phraseology somewhat. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 43, Reporters' Note at
142-43 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
19. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, Explanatory Notes § 28d, comment e at
20 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960) (emphasis added).
20. This surmise is reinforced by the fact that the issue on which Judge Diniock
decided the case apparently was not briefed or argued by either of the defendants.
Brief for Petitioner, p. 7 n.1, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.
21. See text following note 12 supra.
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C.A.V., itself a Cuban corporation over ninety per cent owned by

residents of the United States. On the day that the sugar was being
loaded aboard ship, C.A.V. was nationalized by the Cuban government.
Thereafter, in order to obtain the required consent of the Cuban government to have the loaded ship depart, Farr Whitlock entered into contracts with Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, the government's representative, identical in terms with the earlier contracts between Farr Whitlock and C.A.V.'s subsidiary. The ship then departed
for Casablanca, Morocco.
The bills of lading for the shipment of sugar were assigned by
Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba to Banco Nacional de
Cuba, which in turn sent them to its agent in New York for presentation to Farr Whitlock for payment. The latter accepted the documents,
negotiated the bills of lading to its customer and received payment of
the purchase price. However, it did not pay the proceeds to Banco

Nacional's agent but to Sabbatino, a receiver appointed at the behest
of a stockholder of C.A.V. pursuant to Section 977-b of the New York
Civil Practice Act. 2 Banco Nacional thereupon brought an action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, alleging that Farr Whitlock had illegally converted the bills of
lading and the proceeds, and also praying that Sabbatino be enjoined
from exercising jurisdiction over the sums paid to him.
As a defense against Banco Nacional's motion for summary judgment the defendants raised the claim, along with others that need not
detain us here, 21 that the Cuban decree nationalizing C.A.V.'s property
was not enforceable in courts in the United States.24 It was Judge
Dimock's consideration and disposition of this claim that has made the

Sabbatino case the most-discussed international law decision by an
American court in recent years.
22. This section, which after September 1, 1963 will be distributed among
Sections 1202, 1203, 1207 and 1218 of the New York Business Corporation Law,
authorizes the appointment of a receiver for the New York assets of a nationalized
foreign corporation. See C'imment, Foreign Nationalization: A Statutory Remedy iu
New York, 13 SYRACUsE L. REv. 555 (1962).
23. "Defendants' first claim is that plaintiff lost nothing by Farr Whitlock's
failure to pay the draft because the terms of the nationalization decree did not
embrace the sugar shipment at issue and plaintiff therefore had no interest in the
sugar or the purchase price. Defendants' second claim is that . . . the sugar was
located outside of Cuban territory when the decree took effect and hence courts of
this country will not recognize the decree's extraterritorial effect." 193 F. Supp. at
378. Judge Dimock rejected both of these claims, Id. at 379, and the Second Circuit
assumed the correctness of his rulings. 307 F.2d at 854 n.5.
24. If the decree was unenforceable, then courts in
consider C.A.V. the owner of the sugar at the time when
Exterior de Cuba purported to sell it to Farr Whitlock.
would have no right to enforce, as it attempted to do, the
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DISTRICT COURT OPINION.

The threshold problem faced by Judge Dimock in determining the
enforceability of the Cuban nationalization decree was whether the act
of state doctrine precluded judicial inquiry into its validity. With
respect to the defendants' argument that the decree was invalid since
it had not been published in the Official Gazette of Cuba, the court held
that it could "not refuse to enforce the nationalization decree on the
ground that it did not comply with the formal requisites imposed by
Cuban law. ..

*"25

Nor did the court consider itself "free to refuse

enforcement to the nationalization decree because it violates the public
policy of the forum." 26
Having thus applied the act of state doctrine, Judge Dimock proceeded to the heart of his opinion:
The crucial question remains, however, whether this court can
examine the validity of the Cuban act under international law
and refuse recognition to the act if it is in violation of international
law. Apparently, no court in this country has passed on the
question.27
Noting that "foreign forums have evidenced some willingness to
examine the validity of foreign acts under international law," the
court acknowledged that "by far the strongest support for such examination has come from legal commentators and textwriters. ' 2' After
balancing the reasons for refusal to examine the validity under international law of the Cuban decree against the reasons supporting such

examination, Judge Dimock reached the "inescapable . . . conclusion"
25. 193 F. Supp. at 379, citing RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 28d(1)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960). See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 42 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).
26. 193 F. Supp. at 379-80. See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 43 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Garretson has argued that "the result [in Sabbatinol
might have been better reached if the court had avoided . . . the act of state
doctrine and in accordance with the basic conflict of laws principle, simply refused
to give effect to foreign acts which produce results contrary to the public policy of
the forum." Garretson, op. cit. supra note 3, at 24. See also Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
155, 160 (1962) and Note, 1962 WIS. L. REV. 386, 392. Falk, who has urged "respect for foreign economic acts of state . . . to keep pure the role of domestic courts
as agents of the horizontal international legal order . . .," FALK, JURISDICTION,
IMMUNITIES, AND ACT oF STATE: SUGGESTIONS FOR A MODIFIED APPROACH, IN
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 14 (1961), adopts a "preferred position"
attitude toward foreign governmental acts seriously abridging fundamental human
rights, suggesting that in such cases the courts create "a limited public policy exception to the standard practice of deference." Falk 33. Compare CoMm. ON INT'L
LAW, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, A RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES COURTS 6-8, 11-12 (1959).
27. 193 F. Supp. at 380, citing RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 28d(2) and
comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960). See text at and accompanying note 18 supra.
28. 193 F. Supp. at 380.
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that "the decree in the present action is subject to examination in the
light of the principles of international law." 9
Whether one views Judge Dimock's opinion as constituting a
'restriction of the act of state doctrine '"30 or a refusal "to extend the
act of state doctrine ' 3 ' depends upon one's view of the prior state of
the law.32 That debate will not be reopened here. What is more important is ascertaining Judge Dimock's reason for deeming himself free
to examine the validity under international law of the Cuban decree.
Was he adopting the Restatement position allowing the examination of
foreign acts of state allegedly violating international law ?3 Or was
he conditioning his examination of the Cuban decree upon the tacit
acquiescence of the Department of State - manifested in three diplomatic notes declaring the Cuban nationalization measures to be violative
of international law ? Judge Dimock's approach to Sabbatino strongly
suggests the first alternative, although his opinion does not expressly
adopt the Restatement's tentative position."3 Indeed, by raising and
then rejecting one possible reason for refusing to examine the validity
under international law of the Cuban decree - the desire not to
embarrass the executive in its conduct of foreign relations - the
court resurrects the ghost of Bernstein.
Under what may be called the "green light" theory of the Bernstein cases,3 6 a court will apply the act of state doctrine unless it is
shown by "positive evidence" that it is the "positive intent" of the
29. Id. at 382.
30. Comment, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607, 1615 (1962).
31. Coerper, supra note 3, at 145.
32. Metzger, for instance, would take the position that the opinion restricts
the doctrine, since he believes it applies "even if the validity of the act of the
foreign state is sought to be re-examined because it is deemed to be in violation
of international law." Metzger, supra note 18, at 884. The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, on the other hand, would view the opinion as a
refusal to extend the doctrine, since the Association has stated that "the available
precedents do not require the conclusion that United States courts are barred from
examining the validity of foreign acts of State in violation of international law."
COMM. ON INT'L LAW, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY oF NEW YORK, A RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES COURTS 11 (1959).
33. See note 19 supra.
34. 193 F. Supp. at 381 n.il.
35. See text at and accompanying note 20 supra. Falk observes that "Banco
Nacional follows the Restatement approach, although it did assure itself that no
executive embarrassment would follow from an inquiry into the status of the Cuban
acts under international law." Falk 34. He concludes that "Judge Dimock's view
of executive participation [in act of state cases] allows . . . for an initial veto of the
normal judicial application of international law." Id. at 25 n.90. To the extent
that Judge Dimock's opinion is interpreted as permitting "affirmative executive policy"
to act as a "check" upon a court's ability to pass upon the validity under international law of foreign acts of state (Id. at 22, 23 n.83), it cannot be squared with
the tentative draft of the Restatement, which considered a court's jurisdiction in
such situations "not subject to suspension in order to prevent embarrassment in the
conduct of foreign affairs." See note 19 supra. For reasons given in the text
below, this writer does not accept Falk's analysis of Judge Dimock's opinion on this
point. See text at notes 40-52 infra.
36. See note 6 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss2/2

6

Lillich: A Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square: The Second Circuit and Sabbati
WINTER

1962-63]

A

PYRRHIC VICTORY

Department of State to relax the doctrine's application. 7 In the second
Bernstein case, which has been called "the only case in which the State
Department has suggested to a court that it could ignore or should
ignore the Act of State Doctrine, ' 38 a letter to plaintiff's counsel published in the form of a Department of State press release, expressing
no objection to judicial consideration of the foreign act of state, was
held to constitute sufficient evidence of such intent. 9 Having received
the green light, the Second Circuit in Bernstein proceeded to dispose
of the case on its merits.
Was Judge Dimock using the Bernstein precedent in Sabbatino
when he cited the three Department of State notes? A close reading of
his opinion points to a negative answer. As demonstrated above, Judge
Dimock was operating within the Restatement frame of reference,4"
and the tentative draft of the Restatement clearly rejected the green
light theory when the foreign act of state allegedly violated international
law. 4' Even if the three diplomatic notes cited in Sabbatino constituted
42
sufficient "positive intent" to permit the use of the Bernstein approach,
which is debatable,"' there is nothing in the opinion indicating that the
court used them for this purpose. 44 Having considered the "basic
reason" for judicial refusal to examine the validity of foreign acts of
state - "a wise recognition of and respect for the sovereignity of each
state within its own territory"4 5 - and dismissed it as inapplicable to
37. 163 F.2d at 251.
38. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD SUMMER CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, CORNELL

LAW ScHOOL 105 (1960)
(hereinafter cited "PRocEEDINGS").
39. 210 F.2d at 376.
40. See text at note 20 supra.
41. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, Explanatory Notes § 28d, comment e at
20 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960). Compare RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONs, Explanatory Notes § 44, comment b at 145 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
42. "It is felt that a model for this decision could have been found in the
Bernstein litigation." Note 3 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 282, 285 (1962). See also
Note, 60 MIcH. L. Rev. 231, 233 (1961).
43. One notewriter construes Sabbatino as a liberalized version of Bernstein,
with the requirement of "positive evidence" of "positive intent" being met by something less than express executive approval. Note, 30 FORDHAM L. Rev. 523, 528-29
(1962). See also Note, 8 N.Y.L.F. 148, 153 (1962). As Falk ably demonstrates, "an
external intergovernmental note of protest sent to the Cuban government is not
equivalent to an internal mandate specifically directed at American domestic
courts .... " Falk 22. Therefore, if one assumes that Judge Dimock was following
Bernstein, it is correct to conclude that he misused, or at least misread, those cases.
Id. at 23. This article rejects that assumption, and with it much of Falk's criticism
of Judge Dimock's opinion. Falk's analysis is extremely incisive, however, when
applied to Judge Waterman's Second Circuit opinion. See text at and accompanying
notes 104-114 supra.
44. Quaere: if the District Court was following Bernstein, why did it devote
three pages of its opinion to the consideration of policy factors underlying a question
it believed "no court in this country has passed on . . ."? 193 F. Supp. at 380. Surely
a short paragraph citing Bernstein would have been adequate had the court been so
disposed.
45. 193 F. Supp. at 381.
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the Sabbatino situation,4" Judge Dimock proceeded to demonstrate why
another reason for the rule also was without merit.
Judicial refusal to inquire into the validity of an act of a foreign
state has also been due to a desire not to embarrass the Executive
in its conduct of foreign relations. See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres S. A., 2 Cir., 163 F. 2d 246, certiorari denied 332 U. S.
772, 68 S. Ct. 88, 92 L. Ed. 357. The United States State Department has, however, delivered a note to the Cuban Government
declaring the very nationalization law which plaintiff seeks to
enforce to be in violation of international law. It can scarcely be
believed therefore that judicial examination of the decree in the
light of international law would embarrass the Executive.47
Bernstein is cited by the court as a judicial articulation of one
reason often urged in support of the act of state doctrine, and the
Department of State notes are used to demonstrate that this reason
disappears when the act in question violates international law. While
the passage indicates an awareness of executive sensitivity,48 the ex-

tract, by itself and in the context of the entire opinion, does not support
the conclusion that the court was following the green light approach.4 9
Nor is there anything in it to warrant the statement that the case
"rexplicitly allows the executive view of foreign affairs to act as a potential check upon the scope of normal review." 5 What role, if any,
the executive should play in act of state cases was left unsaid. The
conclusion seems inescapable, then, that the court "chose to break new
ground by basing its holding on the proposition that the 'act of state'
doctrine does not bar examination of foreign acts of state where such
46. "The basis for such recognition and respect vanishes, however, when the
act of a foreign state violates . . . the standards imposed by international law. There
is an end to the right of national sovereignty when the sovereign's acts impinge on
international law." Ibid.
47. 193 F. Supp. at 381.
48. "Since the Executive position was clearly stated, it can be concluded that
the court did not totally discard the rationale designed to prevent embarrassment of
the Executive Branch." Note, 47 IowA L. Rev. 765, 770 (1962). See also RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, Explanatory Notes § 43, Reporters' Note 3 at 143
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
49. See text at and accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
50. Falk 23 n.83 (emphasis added). While the opinion is somewhat less than
precise at this point, it certainly does not "explicitly" uphold the assertion in the
text. Falk also concludes that "Judge Dimock stated that a court should not review
the validity of a foreign act of state under international law unless it is clear that
such review will not 'embarrass the Executive in its conduct of foreign relations.'"
Id. at 21. (emphasis added). Judge Dimock made no such statement, as a glance
at that part of his opinion from which the nine word quotation was taken indicates.
See text at note 47. It may well be that Judge Dimock assumed the possibility of
an "executive veto" in cases like Sabbatino, but he never explicitly stated his views
on the question.
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acts violate international law."'" The Proposed Official Draft of the
Restatement so interprets the District Court opinion. 2
Having concluded that the Cuban nationalization decree was
subject to examination under international legal standards, the court
held that the decree was "a patent violation of international law""3
because: (1) it was not reasonably related to a public purpose; (2)
it discriminated against United States nationals; and (3) it did not provide adequate compensation. 4 This article will not explore the court's
determination of the substantive international law issue, except to note
that Judge Dimock considered it one for the court. Observing that the
Department of State had previously declared the decree to be in violation of international law, 5 he added that "the facts and law of the
case, irrespective of that determination of the Executive, require the
same conclusion by the Judicial [sic] with regard to the decree."'"

Thus, as Falk states, "it would be incorrect to attribute the result in
Banco Nacional to judicial abdication in the face of executive policy."5 7
In sum, the District Court's decision in Sabbatino staked out a
large area where, without the necessity of executive permission, the
act of state doctrine was not to apply. The decision thus avoided making the courts mere "conduits for the fulfillment of executive policy,"5 "
while at the same time raising hopes "that individuals injured by foreign acts of state in violation of. international law might more often
obtain a day in court." 59 The increased availability of municipal courts,
in turn, would contribute to an international consensus on such questions as nationalization. The Second Circuit's decision, while affirming
the judgment of the District, Court, represents an unfortunate retreat
on all these points.
51. Note, 60 MICH. L. REv. 231, 233 (1961).
52. See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, Explanatory Notes § 43, Reporters'
Note 3 at 143 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), stating that the opinion "tends to
support an exception to the doctrine where the act of a foreign state is challenged
under international law, but also involves executive indications related to § 44
[which restates Bcrnstcin approach]." A comment to section 44 notes that "itis
possible but not certain that courts in the United States will develop an exception to
the act of state doctrine, independent of the rule stated in this Section, where a violation of international law is charged." RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 44,
comment b at 145 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
53. 193,F. Supp. at 386.
54. 193 F. Supp. at 384-86.
55. 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1960).
56. 193 F. Supp. at 384.
57. Falk 16. He cautions, however, that domestic courts "tend to invoke norms
that correspond with the national preference. Banco Nacional is itself an illustration
of institutionalized bias." 1d. at 10.
58. Id. at 25 n.90.
59. COMM. ON INT'L LAW, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, A
RECONSIDERATION

(1959).

OF THE

ACT OF

STATE

DOCTRINE

IN

UNITED

STATES
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SECOND CIRCUIT OPINION.

The Court of Appeals, after rejecting Farr Whitlock's argument
that the jurisdiction of the District Court was defective,6" turned its
attention to the act of state doctrine, which it acknowledged was "one
of the conflict of laws rules applied by American courts" and "not
itself a rule of international law."6 1 Citing numerous cases where courts
of other countries have inquired into the legality of steps taken by
foreign sovereigns, 62 the court then traced the history of the doctrine
in American jurisprudence63 and listed instances where it has been
recognized and applied by the Second Circuit and other courts.14 Then
Judge Waterman reached the heart of his opinion, the rationale behind
the Second Circuit's exception to the act of state doctrine.
However, when the executive branch of our Government announces that it does not oppose inquiry by American courts into
the legality of foreign acts, an exception to the judicial abnegation
required by the act of state doctrine has arisen and has been
recognized both in this circuit and elsewhere. In Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche - Amerikaansche Stoomvaart - MaatschappiJ, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiarn), when we received word
from the State Department that it was State Department policy
to permit American courts to pass on the validity of acts done by
Nazi officials, our court rescinded its earlier mandate based upon
the act of state doctrine, preventing the district court from questioning the validity of the acts of the German Nazi government.
See 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949) ....
This exception is applicable to the case before us. While the
case has been pending we have been enlightened, as the court was
in the Bernstein case, supra, as to the attitude of the Department
of State.... These statements are somewhat ambiguous, perhaps
intentionally so. But at the least they express a belief on the part
of those responsible for the conduct of our foreign affairs that the
courts here should decide the status here of Cuban decrees. 65
The import of the above passage is obvious. The Second Circuit
has slapped Sabbatino into the Bernstein mold. 6 Rejecting by implica60. 307 F.2d at 854.

61. Id. at 855. See text at and accompanying note 11 supra.
62. Id. at 855 n.6.
63. Id. at 855-857.
64. Id. at 857. Among the cases listed were the first Bernstein decision, note 6
supra, and Republic of Cuba v. Pons, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 960 (1962), 39 U. DEr. L.J. 125 (1961), 13 SYRACUSz L. Rev. 327 (1961).
See Garretson, op. cit. supra note 3 at 24-25 and text accompanying note 115 infra.
65. 307 F.2d at 857-858. [emphasis added.]
66. The possibility of such an approach has been recognized. See text at and
accompanying notes 42-43 supra. Compare Note, 47 IowA L. REv. 765, 774 (1962) :
had previously denounced the decree in question
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tion the promising exception introduced by Judge Dimock and commented upon by the Proposed Official Draft of the Restatement,"7 the
Court of Appeals has applied the act of state doctrine, and with it the
Bernstein exception, to cases where the validity of the foreign act is
challenged under international law. The fact that the court perceived
the Department of State's green light (albeit through a glass, darkly),
not the fact that the Cuban decree was alleged to violate international
law, operated to permit the consideration of the case on its merits.
While the Second Circuit reaches the same result as the District Court,
its reasoning is far less satisfactory.
In the first place, Judge Waterman's opinion "extends" rather
than "restricts" the scope of the act of state doctrine.68 The court
implies that, absent Department of State consent, the doctrine would
apply. Hence a broad exception based upon an alleged violation of
international law is replaced by a narrow exception conditioned upon
the wishes of the executive. As Metzger, a supporter of the approach
adopted by the Court of Appeals, has observed, "it is unlikely that there
would be many cases in which the State Department would convey
directly to a court such a 'supervening expression of Executive
policy.' "69 Although the Department of State apparently has decided
that the Cuban nationalization decrees should be subject to judicial
inquiry,7" there is no assurance that this position will be maintained in
the future with respect to other foreign acts of state, whether involving
71
nationalizations or not.

This injection of political considerations into the judicial process,
which allows the Department of State to change a lawsuit's "outcome
by putting the executive thumb on the scales, '"72 is rationalized on the
ground that the wholesale examination of foreign acts of state under
international law might upon occasion embarrass the executive in its
should not be seized upon by courts in the future as a basis for distinguishing the
decision in the instant case."
67. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
68. See text at and accompanying note 32 supra.
69. Metzger, supra note 18, at 890. Elsewhere he has stated that "except in
the very odd situation, the Act of State Doctrine would be applied lock, stock, and
barrel, as it has been .... As I visualize it, the upshot of the existing law is that
Act of State Doctrine will apply, except in a very odd case and very infrequently."
PROCEEDINGs 105.

70. But see text accompanying note 98 infra.
71. Or even, for that matter, with regard to the Cuban decrees. Fisher, answering
Metzger, note 69 supra, has pointed out that "if there is another change of government
in Cuba, the titles to sugar will depend upon whether it [examination of the decrees]
is vexing or not. I take it that the notion is that how the case should come out
should be a political decision. If the litigation is going to be harassing, let the
State Department say so. Let us not have a rule just so 'we diplomats, who know how
these things ought to be run, can decide the matter.'" PROCEEDINGS 105.
72. Id. at 104 (Fisher).
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conduct of foreign affairs. 7' This argument, one of the most overrated
in the annals of American legal history, 4 is no more appealing in the
context of the act of state doctrine than it is when the question of
sovereign immunity is involved.7 5 The question of whether a foreign
act of state violates international law, like the issue of sovereign immunity, is a juridical question, and "the duty of the courts to render
a decision on the merits should not be subordinated to political considerations on no more solid grounds than exaggerated apprehension
of national prejudice to the conduct of United States foreign rela73.
My own feeling on the matter is that the present posture of the law as
reflected in the second Bernstein case, namely, that the Act of State Doctrine of
judicial abstention will apply unless the State Department indicates to the
court that foreign relations, in effect, will not be vexed and that, consequently,
it is appropriate, in the Department's view, for the court to go to the merits, this
present state of the law is just about where the law ought to be.
This, it seems to me, derives from the basic rationale of the Doctrine, which
is a foreign relations doctrine. The courts say, in effect, 'Since our judging of
a foreign act affecting persons or property within a foreign country's jurisdiction
could lead to foreign relations vexation, we, the court, do not feel confident
that we will be able to make a judgment on that vexatious question; since
the political arm of the government, which is supposed to be cognizant of the
foreign relations implications, is best able to give a judgment on that, we will
abstain, unless we get a statement from the foreign relations arm of the
government that it is all right that we proceed, their having taken into account
foreign relations considerations.' Id. at 84 (Metzger).
74. "Stan Metzger presented the viewpoint of 'embarrassing the executive department by a court decision.' Can you give me a single case, in the whole history
of the United States, where the government was embarrassed by a court decision?
They are embarrassed by many other things." Id. at 15 (Domke).
75. Metzger, who also urges judicial deference to the executive in sovereign
immunity cases, once again, bases his argument upon considerations of possible
executive embarrassment. Id. at 12. Through a series of judicial decisions and
executive pronouncements, it has now become firmly established that American
courts, in the interest of smooth foreign relations, will grant sovereign immunity
if the claim is "recognized and allowed" by the Department of State. See generally
Lillich, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Immunity of Forcign
State-Owned Commercial Vessels, 28 GEo. WASH. L. Rgv. 408, 412-15 (1960). Conversely, where the Department of State has refused to suggest immunity when asked,
this silence is treated for all practical purposes as a finding of no immunity. Lillich,
A Case Study In Consular and Diplomatic Immunity, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 305, 31415 (1961).
While many writers have criticized this "judicial abdication" by the courts,
Id. at 314 n.58, until recently there was no indication that the courts believed themselves bound by Department of State pronouncements. As Judge Fahy stated, the
suggestion of the executive "isn't conclusive. It isn't a question of taking away
jurisdiction. It is comity. It is a statement of views emanating as it does, in the
field of international competence, in the State Department, that is entitled to great
consideration and deference on the part of the courts." PROCEEDINGS 136 (emphasis
added). See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 75(2) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962).
Several years ago, however, a representative of the Department of State
advanced the idea that under the separation of powers doctrine the courts were
constitutionally required to follow the Department's advice. PROCEEDINGS 4. Since
then courts have decided that the Department's determination was "conclusive" upon
them, Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 301, 204
N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (Sup. Ct. 1960), 12 SYRAcusE L. Rev. 270 (1960), and that
once the Department had spoken the "court was without further jurisdiction of
" Republic of Cuba v. Dixie Paint & Varnish Co., 104 Ga. App. 854,
the case ....
123 S.E.2d 198 (1961).
The ultimate step in the development of this pseudo-constitutional theory was
taken in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), 50 CALl'.
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tions." 76 In addition, toleration of executive intervention, as Falk
warns, "is itself a deprecation of the commitment to international law.
It undermines the prestige of international law in domestic courts if
its application depends upon a prior political authorization."7 7
A corollary to the embarrassment argument, noted but not developed in Judge Waterman's opinion,7" is the contention that permitting
courts to pass upon the validity under international law of foreign acts
of state
would in all likelihood actually hinder the kind of government-togovernment negotiation for a settlement which, if recent history
is any indication, is the most effective way to secure the maximum
compensation obtainable, and to distribute it equitably.79
L. REv. 559 (1962), 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 492 (1962), which bids fair to become the
international legal monstrosity of American courts for the 1960's. See Garretson,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 25-26. Among other issues raised in Rich was the question
whether a Cuban state-owned commercial vessel was entitled to sovereign immunity.
The Department of State, by telephone and hastily-drafted letter, informed the
court that the prompt release of the vessel would avoid disturbance to our foreign
relations. Despite the fact that the Department had urged the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in the 1952 Tate Letter (26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 [1952])
and had fought successfully for its adoption at the 1958 Geneva Conference on the
Law of the Sea (Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/L. 52 [1958], reprinted in 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 834
[1958]), the court held that the Department's abrupt turnabout "should be accepted
by the court without further inquiry .... We think that the doctrine of the separation
of powers under our Constitution requires us to assume that all pertinent considerations have been taken into account by the Secretary of State in reaching his conclusion." 295 F.2d at 26. But see Comment, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607, 1611 (1962).
The behavior of the Department in the Rich case underscores the validity of
Timberg's observation that "there is pressure on the State Department to determine legal issues on the basis of diplomatic relations and temporary political expediency." Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and SelfDeception, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 109, 128 (1961). For another example of political
considerations governing Department decisions, see Note, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 559,
565 n.40 (1962). Yet courts, fearful of "embarrassing" the executive in its conduct of
foreign affairs, continue to defer to the Department on this wholly legal issue. Indeed,
a Florida appellate court recently held that a Cuban governmental agency was entitled
to a writ of mandamus compelling a lower court judge to perform his "clear legal
duty to enter an order recognizing the suggestion of sovereign immunity . ...
State ex rel. Nat'l Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137 So. 2d 581, 583
(Fla. 1962).
As Stevenson notes, "we have been too concerned in many aspects of this
question with the extent to which judicial decisions could embarrass the executive.
I think that in many of these areas . . . if you can find that what has previously
been called a political question is a judicial question, and let the courts handle it,
that, far from increasing international tension and embarrassing the executive, it
will actually reduce international tension." PROCEEDINGS 72.

76. COMM. ON INT'L LAW, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES COURTS

A
11

(1959).
77. Falk 24. On a more theoretical level, he contends that executive intervention
"relegates the role of domestic courts as agents of a nascent international legal order
to the marginal circumstance where political considerations bearing on the controversy are ambiguous or non-existent." Id. at 20. See text at notes 69-71 supra.
78. 307 F.2d at 857. See RE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 75-79.
79. Metzger, supra note 18, at 892. See also Falk 30, 32; Comment, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1607, 1616 (1962).
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There is a certain plausibility in this argument. In the absence of
available international remedies, often the only avenue of redress open
to a person who has been injured by the wrongful act of a foreign
state is the diplomatic espousal of his claim by the Department of
State."° When the wrong arises from the nationalization of property,
it is most likely that his claim, along with those of many other claimants, will be handled by means of a lump sum settlement between the
United States and the foreign country. 8 ' In the post-war period, lump
sum settlements have been received from the communist countries of
Yugoslavia, Rumania and Poland,12 and in all probability such a settlement will be negotiated someday with the Republic of Cuba." While
these settlements only partially compensate claimants for the loss of
their property, 4 they are a method of securing some redress and thus
are generally favored by claimants." "This traditional method of
settlement is impaired," it is argued, "when a foreign municipal court
attempts to give relief by passing judgment on the contested official act
of the government." 8
Is it really impaired? No categorical answer can be given, Sabbatino being the first American case where the act of state doctrine has
not been applied and the claimant relegated to "the poverty and inadequacy of the international remedies .. ." If, as some assert, "negotiations through diplomatic channels are unlikely to result in prompt or
adequate relief,"8 8 it would seem that there is little to impair. In Sabbatino, for instance, Judge Waterman observes with respect to the
Cuban nationalization decrees that "no aid appears to be available
through diplomatic channels to the injured parties." ' Even if the
situation with respect to Cuba had not reached rock bottom, it is
doubtful whether one or more judicial decisions passing upon the international legal validity of the Cuban decrees would have made much
difference. Certainly the court's action in Rich"° did not seem to improve the diplomatic climate to any great degree, and the application
80.

LILLICH & CHRISTENSON,

PRESENTATION ch.

81. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL
MISSIONS 10, 102 (1962).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

INTERNATIONAL

CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION

AND

6 (1962).
CLAIMS:

THEIR ADJUDICATION

BY NATIONAL

COM-

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 105-09.
Id. at 117-18.
Falk 27.

CoMm. ON INT'L LAW, ASS'N OF THE BAR O THE CITY oF NEW YORK, A
RECONSIDERATION Or THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES COURTS 2
(1959).

Falk himself recognizes the weakness of international remedies.

Falk 2 n.3.

88. Comment, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607, 1618 (1962).
89. 307 F.2d at 868-869. The Department of State, while receiving claims for
eventual action, is not espousing individual claims against Cuba nor negotiating for
their settlement by a lump sum. LILLICH & CHRISTENSON, op. cit. supra note 80, at 2.

90. See note 75 supra.
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of the act of state doctrine in the Pons case 91 also had little observable
effect. Lump sum settlements, being politically negotiated compromises,
involve many practical considerations, 92 but with one exception there
is little evidence that the position of municipal courts has been an
important factor during negotiations.9"
Even assuming that the possibilities of executive embarrassment
and of hindrance to claims negotiations justify handling cases like
Sabbatino under the Bernstein approach, serious problems are presented
by the manner in which the Second Circuit went about searching for
the necessary green light. The first Bernstein case, it will be recalled,
indicated that the court would relax its application of the act of state
doctrine upon the showing by "pogitive evidence" that it was the
"positive intent" of the Department of State to permit such relaxation. 4
This "definitive expression of Executive Policy," as it was referred to
in the second Bernstein case,95 was satisfied there by a letter to plaintiff's counsel expressing no objection to judicial examination of the
foreign act of state.9" If one views Judge Dimock's District Court
opinion as an application or misapplication of the Bernstein approach,97
then the three diplomatic notes declaring the Cuban decrees violative of
international law must constitute the green light. Falk, assuming for
purposes of argument the wisdom of judicial deference, contends that
these notes do not constitute the express mandate required by the
Bernstein precedent. "Why," he asks, "should a domestic court pay
any attention whatsoever to a note that passes between states on a
diplomatic level ?,,"'
91. See note 64 supra.
92. LILLICH, op. cit. supra note 81, at 106-09.
93. In Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1st Dep't 1961), the Department of State, in a suggestion of sovereign immunity

made to a court with respect to certain assets claimed by Czechoslovakia, indicated
that the Czech Government, if its claim of immunity was not granted, intended to
deduct the amount of these assets from the pending lump sum settlement of Czech
nationalization claims. Id. at 118-19, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 136. Timberg notes that this
deduction, assuming that it was agreed upon by United States negotiators, "probably
amounts at most to 4 or 5 mills on each dollar of provable claims. . . '." Timberg,
Exproporiation Measures and State Trading, 55 PROC. Aims. Soc'Y INT'L L. 113, 120
(1961).
94. 163 F.2d at 251.
95. 210 F.2d at 375.
96. Id. at 376.
97. See note 43 supra. This writer, once again, does not.
98. Falk 15. The brief filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary
of State in the Rich case, note 75 supra, demonstrates why general pronouncements
are an untrustworthy guide for judicial conduct under the green light theory. For
there the Solicitor General advocated the application of the act of state doctrine,
contending that "it would not be inconsistent for the State Department to challenge
the validity of the Cuban expropriation under international law, and at the same
time to accept the validity of the confiscation of American property located in Cuba,
so far as our domestic courts are concerned." Quoted from Brief for Petitioner,
p. 26, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. The extract is also quoted in Baade,
The Validity of Foreign Confiscations: An Addendum, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 504, 506
(1962). It shows quite clearly that the executive branch did not intend the three
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Judge Waterman's Second Circuit opinion openly follows the
Bernstein cases but omits reference to the three diplomatic notes. Instead, the court sees its green light in three off-the-record pieces of
correspondence. The first of these is a letter from the Legal Adviser of
the Department of State to counsel for the amici curiae in the case,
two sugar companies. The court quotes this letter as follows:
"The Department of State has not, in the Bahia de Nipe case
or elsewhere, done anything inconsistent with the position taken on
the Cuban nationalization by Secretary Herter. Whether or not
these nationalizations will in the future be given effect in the
United States is, of course, for the courts to determine. Since the
Sabbatino case and other similar cases are at present before the
courts, any comments on this question by the Department of State
would be out of place at this time. As you yourself point out,
statements by the executive branch are highly susceptible of misconstruction." (Emphasis added. )"
The second communication relied upon by the court, from the
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to counsel for the
amici curiae, stated only that the letter writer, the Legal Adviser and
the Secretary of State all agreed that " 'the Department should not
comment on matters pending before-the courts.' ""' Lastly, the court
quotes a telegram sent by the Department to litigants in a Florida
state court action involving the Cuban nationalization decrees: " 'Effect
in U.S. of Decrees, etc. of Castro regime is question for court in which
case heard.'

"101

Judge Waterman acknowledges that the above three statements
"are somewhat ambiguous, perhaps intentionally so," but he concludes
that "at the least they express a belief on the part of those responsible
for the conduct of our foreign affairs that the courts here should decide
diplomatic notes to serve as the "definitive expression of Executive Policy" in all
act of state cases, if indeed they were ever intended to serve the purpose for which
Falk maintains Judge Dimock used them.
99. 307 F.2d at 858. The italicized sentence comes like an ill wind out of the
mouth of the Legal Advisor after the intervention by the Department of State in
the Rich case, note 75 supra. Unfortunately, the Department has never deemed comments upon pending cases "out of place."
100. 307 F.2d at 858. This statement must come as a surprise to counsel in
many cases, especially to those in Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, note 93 supra.
101. 307 F.2d at 858. The case is Kane v. Nat'l Institute of Agrarian Reform,
18 Fla. Supp. 116 (Cir. Ct. 1961), discussed in Bayitch, International Law, Fifth
Survey of Florida Law 1959-1961, 16 U. MIAmi L. Rv. 240, 271-72 (1961). It is
ironic to note that, despite the existence of this telegram, the court in Kane presumably based its refusal to apply the act of state doctrine upon the alleged violation
of international law, following the District Court opinion in Sabbatino, and not upon
the green light theory. Rather prophetically, in view of Judge Waterman's Second
Circuit opinion in Sabbatino, Bayitch observed that "with this telegram in hand, the
court [in Kane] could have completely ignored the act of state doctrine and followed the
two Bernstein cases." Id. at 272.
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the status here of Cuban decrees."' 2 Since the Department of State
"has expressed a lack of concern as to the outcome of the litigation, '"103
the court decided that it was free to determine the case on its merits.
The Second Circuit, in using the green light theory, has introduced
two modifications to the Bernstein approach.'
First, it finds the required executive approval in informal, off-the-record correspondence two letters to counsel for the amici curiae and a telegram directed to
someone in a pending Florida action. In the second Bernstein case
executive policy was evidenced by a formal Department of State press
release as well as by a letter to counsel.' 5 There is good reason to
require such a formal pronouncement. Letters to amicus curiae, even
if unambiguous, are a haphazard method of communicating executive
approval to a court. They are not part of the record. They need not
be shown to counsel for the parties. They may be used or withheld to
suit the purposes of the recipient. In short, their use in this fashion
rubs against the grain of due process. '"
Telegrams and other communications in unrelated litigation are
an even more untrustworthy guide for judicial action under Bernstein.
Assuming, as Judge Waterman does, that executive approval is required before a court may disregard the act of state doctrine, why
should approval in one case, even when expressed in general terms, be
regarded as approval in all similar cases? The possibility exists that
the executive branch may have decided that our foreign affairs permitted an exception in one particular case, while requiring the doctrine's application in all others. And if the executive branch actually
has taken different positions in different cases, as it apparently has with
respect to actions involving Cuban nationalization decrees, 1 7 should
the court be free to select the executive communication that is called
to its attention or fits its purpose?
Here, for instance, Judge Waterman took notice of a "somewhat
ambiguous" telegram to a lower state court, while presumably ignoring
a flatly contrary statement made by the Department of Justice on behalf
of the Secretary of State in a proceeding before the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Rich case.'
There, with 5,000 tons of ex102. 307 F.2d at 858.
103. Id. at 858-59.
104. Banco Nacional de Cuba contends that the case "is clearly distinguishable.
We have here no 'positive evidence' of an intent by the executive to relax the Act
of State doctrine. . . . On the contrary, all we have here is an evident desire on the
Brief
part of the State Department to avoid taking such a positive position.
for Petitioner, pp. 10-11, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.
105. 210 F.2d at 376.
106. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 20-21, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.
107. See text at and accompanying notes 98 supra and 109 infra.
108. See note 75 supra. An application for a stay pending application for a
writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court during September 1961.
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propriated sugar involved, the Solicitor General strongly argued for
the application of the act of state doctrine:
This act-of-state doctrine prevents any inquiry by our courts into
the acts of the Cuban Government in Cuba which, in this case,
may have resulted in the expropriation or confiscation of sugar
or other property owned by petitioner in Cuba.
This doctrine applies with full force to preclude judicial review,
in domestic courts, even where the act of the foreign state is
asserted, as here, to be in conflict with or in violation of international law.109
That Judge Waterman, if informed of this statement, should have
taken it into consideration seems too obvious to belabor. What weight
he should have given it is another matter. Did it outweigh the telegram in the Kane case,"' that telegram having come directly from the
Department of State? If so, what about the two letters to counsel for
the amici curiae."' Did they not tip the scales against judicial abstention? These questions highlight the difficulty in trying to divine executive policy in a particular case from conflicting pronouncements made
in other proceedings. Certainly this departure from Bernstein is an
unwise one which is bound to inject yet another aspect of uncertainty
into act of state cases.
The second modification of Bernstein introduced by the Court of
Appeals concerns the substance rather than the manner of the executive communication. In Bernstein, "positive evidence" of the Department of State's "positive intent" to give the green light was made the
sine qua non of judicial disregard of the act of state doctrine. The
court saw this green light in a formal Department of State communication which stated that its policy was " 'to relieve American courts from
any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the acts of Nazi officials.' "112 The "somewhat ambiguous"
statements in Sabbatino cast a far weaker light. The Department, specifically stating that any comments by it would be out of place, said
only that the effect of the Cuban nationalization decrees was a question
for the court. Judge Waterman interprets these statements as allowing
the court to ignore the act of state doctrine and decide the case on its
merits. An alternative (although admittedly less likely) reading would
be that the Department intended the court to apply usual case law,
109. Quoted fromn Brief for Petitioner, pp. 26-27, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino.
110. See text at note 101 supra.
111. See'text at notes 99-100 supra.
112. 210 F.2d at 376.
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including the act of state doctrine and the Bernstein exception, and in
the absence of affirmative executive approval refuse to go into the case's
merits."' In any event, one may apply Falk's analysis of Judge
Dimock's opinion to the opinion of Judge Waterman and conclude that
it states "a confusing approach to the relation between executive and
judiciary in matters of foreign relations that neither agrees with
precedents nor enunciates an acceptable new direction of policy.""' 4
The position of the courts after the Second Circuit's Sabbatino
seems to be as follows. If the executive branch remains silent, the act
of state doctrine will be applied."' If the executive expressly indicates
that the court may consider the case on its merits, under the Bernstein
approach the court may do so." 6 What has been added is a liberal
construction of Bernstein which sees a green light in a seemingly neutral
statement by the executive branch, thus making it much easier for
litigants to avail themselves of the Bernstein exception. For convenience, this modification of Bernstein may be called the Sabbatino corollary. Rejecting the presumption that the doctrine applies unless the
Department of State specifically advises to the contrary," 7 Judge
Waterman seems to be establishing a presumption of the green light
when the Department does speak. This attitude, coupled with the
court's acceptance of informal, off-the-record manifestations of the
green light, will afford many more litigants a remedy in American
courts.
While any modification of Bernstein is welcome, certainly the
Second Circuit's is less gratifying than the District Court's. For an
alleged violation of international law is no longer sufficient to create
an exception to the act of state doctrine: some degree of executive
intervention, even if in another case, is required. The courts' role as
113. See text at note 109 supra.
114. Falk 26.
115. See Republic of Cuba v. Pons, note 64 supra. In this case the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia applied the act of state doctrine to a counterclaim by a Cuban national. Since no violation of international law was alleged, the
decision is distinguishable from the District Court's opinion in Sabbatino. Note,
13 SYRACUsit L. Rev. 327, 329 and n.13 (1962). In addition, the Department of
State had not responded to the court's invitation to file a brief, so the decision may
be distinguished from the Court of Appeals opinion in Sabbatino on the ground of no
executive approval. In a dissent, Judge Burger interpreted the Department's silence
to mean that the court was free to adjudicate the case. 294 F.2d at 927. See Comment,
75 HARV. L. Rzv. 1607, 1619 (1962). See also text at note 117 infra. Quaere: could
not the court have cited the Kane telegram, as did Judge Waterman, and on this
basis have refused to apply the doctrine?
116. Since under the Second Circuit's Sabbatino a court may find its green
light in correspondence made in connection with an entirely different case, other
courts then may be able to consider similar cases on their merits.. See quaere note
114 supra.
117. Among others, Metzger (PROCEEDINGs 86-87) and Reeves (Id. at 81)
have advocated the continuance of this presumption and Fisher (Id. at 86) and
Stevenson (Id. at 89) have opted for its reversal.
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conduits of executive policy is thus further solidified, incompatible as
that may be with the concept of the rule of law."'
Having decided that it was able to pass upon the merits of the
case by taking advantage of the Bernstein exception to the act of state
doctrine, the court then faced the question of the validity of the Cuban
decree. Like the District Court," 9 the Court of Appeals took the
position that it could not hold the decree invalid because it violated
Cuban law 2 or because it was contrary to American public policy.''
However, once again like the District Court, 2 2 it held that it could
inquire into the Cuban "decree's consistency with international rules
of law."' 23 The court thus reached the same three-pronged argument
of invalidity raised by Farr Whitlock below: that the decree violated
international law because: (1) adequate compensation was not provided; (2) the purpose of the seizure was retaliation against the United
124
States; and (3) the expropriation was discriminatory in operation.
The court's determination of this substantive international law
issue need not be fully explored in this article. Prefacing his discussion
' 2
with the needless dicta that "the law of nations is a hazy concept '
and that "anyone who undertakes a search for the principles of international law cannot help but be aware of the nebulous nature of the
substance we call international law,"' 2 Judge Waterman sought to
find and apply international law free from "institutionalized bias" or
executive pressure.' 2 7 Stating the traditional international law rule
requiring the payment of just compensation, 8 he also took note that:
Tremendous social and cultural changes are occurring in many
parts of the world today. Many countries have acted upon the
principle that, in order to carry out desired economic and social
118. A similar trend has been evident in sovereign immunity cases. See text at
and accompanying notes 58 and 75 supra.
119. See text at and accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
120. 307 F.2d at 859.
121. Ibid. Taking note of "the admonition that public policy is an 'unruly
horse . . .,'" the court concluded that the "decision of this case based upon
the public policy of this forum is undesirable because reliance upon such a basis
for decision results in a nationalistic, or municipal, solution of a problem that is
clearly international." Ibid. Thus the court avoids the charge of "institutionalized
bias" that might arise from a decision based upon public policy. See text accompanying notes 26 and 57 supra.
122. See text at note 29 supra.
123. 307 F.2d at 859. The court aptly observes that "although it can be argued
that nationalistic prejudice could affect the decision in cases of this sort, it is also
often claimed that other biases in various obnoxious forms are present in the minds
of judges in other types of cases." Id. at 860. Compare text accompanying note 121
supra.
124. See text at note 54 supra.
125. 307 F.2d at 859.
126. Id. at 860.
127. Compare the approach of the District Court at notes 55-57 supra. See
also text at and accompanying note 129 infra.
128. 307 F.2d at 863.
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reforms of vast magnitude, they must have the right to seize
private property without providing compensation for the taking.
They argue that because of the paucity of funds in their governmental coffers, it would be impossible to carry out large-scale
measures in the name of social welfare if they had to provide
compensation immediately, or even if required of them later ...
It is commonplace in many parts of the world for a country not
to pay for what it takes.' 29
Then, leaning over backward to avoid a "partisan posture,"' 3 ° he
refused to decide the "difficult question" of "whether a government's
failure, in and of itself, to pay adequate compensation for the property
it takes is a breach of international responsibility. . . .""' Instead, he
conditioned his holding upon a finding that the Cuban decree was an
act of reprisal against the United States which discriminated against
United States nationals and therefore violated international law." 2 The
holding, more narrow and limited than that of the District Court,"'
is spelled out quite clearly:
Since the Cuban decree of expropriation not only failed to
provide adequate compensation but also involved a retaliatory
purpose and a discrimination against United States nationals, we
hold that the decree was in violation of international law." 4
The decree having violated international law, Judge Waterman reasoned that Banco Nacional de Cuba's title was invalid and therefore
affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint." 5' Both courts
thus reached the same destination, although the route taken by the
Second Circuit was far less satisfactory.
129. Id. at 864. Elsewhere the court speculates that perhaps "international law
is not violated when equal treatment is accorded aliens and natives, regardless of
the quality of the treatment or the motives behind that treatment." Id. at 867.
Such statements, coming from an eminent jurist on one of the most-respected courts
in the United States, are bound to undercut the Department of State's argument
for prompt, effective and adequate compensation in nationalization cases. No further
demonstration that the court is free of "institutionalized bias" is necessary.
130. Falk 41.
131. 307 F.2d at 864. Compare Judge Dimock's position, which views the failure to
provide adequate compensation as an independent ground for holding the Cuban decrees
violative of international law. 193 F. Supp. at 385.
132. 307 F.2d at 868. Judge Dimock also held that the Cuban decrees violated
international law on both of these independent grounds. 193 F. Supp. at 384-85.
133. See text at notes 53-54 supra.
134. 307 F.2d at 868. Any possible idea that Judge Waterman intended to
hold the decrees invalid on three independent grounds is dispelled by his phrasing
of the question for decision. Id. at 864. See also text at note 130 supra, which
negates such a possibility.
135. The court rejected the argument that the nationalization decree vested good
title to the sugar in Cuba, subject only to a duty to pay compensation for the taking.
Id. at 869. Compare Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign
Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960) and Wortley, Indonesian Nationalization
Measures - on Intervention, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 680 (1961) with Baade, Indonesian
Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts - A Reply, 54 Am. J. INT'L L.
801 (1960) and Baade, note 98 supra.
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CONCLUSION.

What should be a court's position when faced with an act of state
case where the act allegedly violates international law? Three main
alternatives, aside from automatic application of the doctrine, stand
out:
1. The doctrine should be applied unless the Department of State
relieves the court from restraint. This alternative finds support in the Bernstein cases, as modified by Judge Waterman's
Sabbatino corollary.
2. The doctrine should not be applied unless, for foreign policy
reasons, the Department of State intervenes and requests its
application, This alternative is advanced by the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York.
3. The doctrine should not be applied when the act of state in
question allegedly violates international law. This alternative
is essentially that of the tentative draft of the Restatement as
adopted by Judge Dimock's District Court opinion in
Sabbatino.
By shifting from the third to the first alternative, Judge Waterman changes the basis for the "exception" to the act of state doctrine
from alleged violation of international law to executive approval. The
role of international law in act of state cases is further reduced by the
fact that the substantive question of whether the act violates international law will now not arise in many cases where the Department
of State elects not to give the green light. The reintroduction of the
executive into the picture, moreover, virtually forecloses the hope,

raised by Judge Dimock's opinion, that a forum for the litigation of
one type of international law case might be available on a regular basis.
Thus, while the Second Circuit did refuse to apply the act of state
doctrine in Sabbatino and did hold that the Cuban nationalization
decree violated international law, its decision, in the view of many
international lawyers, will be considered a pyrrhic victory.
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